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Abstract
This paper studies the impact of outsourcing on individual wages. In contrast
to the standard approach in the literature, we focus on domestic outsourcing as
well as foreign outsourcing. By using a simple theoretical model, we argue that, if
outsourcing is associated with specialization gains arising from an increase in the
extent of the market for intermediate goods, domestic outsourcing tends to increase
wages for both unskilled and skilled labor. We use a panel data set of workers
in Danish manufacturing industries to show that domestic and foreign outsurcing
aﬀect wages as predicted by the theory.
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1 Introduction
The labor market implications of outsourcing of activities to countries abundant in un-
skilled labor — such as countries in Eastern Europe and Asia — is a topical issue, and the
hypothesis seems to be that unskilled workers in Western Europe and the US have been
the losers while skilled workers have gained. This view is supported by much empirical
evidence showing that the relative demand of unskilled workers in Western Europe and
the US has declined through international specialization (see Feenstra & Hanson (2003)
for a survey). This literature is mostly considering how outsourcing aﬀects the relative
demand and, in turn, the relative wage of skilled and unskilled labor. The dominating
view is that outsourcing is biased towards activities intensive in the use unskilled labor.
In this paper, we want to divert attention towards another eﬀect of outsourcing, namely
specialization gains that arise as a result of a greater extent of the market for intermediate
goods. By using a simple theoretical model, we argue that outsourcing has two diﬀerent
eﬀects; a comparative advantage eﬀect and an extent of the market eﬀect. The compar-
ative advantage eﬀect is due to specialization gains resulting from exploitation of factor
endowment diﬀerences across countries, and this corresponds to the traditional eﬀect in-
vestigated in the literature cited above. The extent of the market eﬀect arises if labor is
more specialized in a larger market than in a smaller market as originally described by
Adam Smith in The Wealth of Nations. An important diﬀerence between the two types of
eﬀects is that the comparative advantage eﬀect will be skill biased, and primarily benefit
the abundant factor in a country, whereas there is no reason to expect the extent of the
market eﬀect to be skill biased.
Empirically, it is not straightforward to distinguish between the two eﬀects since for-
eign outsourcing typically gives rise to a mixture of the two eﬀects. This would be the
case if, for example, foreign outsourcing partly originates from countries with diﬀerent
skill endowments and partly from countries with similar skill endowments. Domestic out-
sourcing, on the other hand, is presumably not skill biased and should, as a result, capture
the extent of the market eﬀect. Therefore, in contrast to the usual approach in the lit-
erature, we focus on the consequences of foreign as well as domestic outsourcing. In our
empirical analysis, we consider the Danish labor market, and since Denmark is a skilled
labor abundant country, foreign outsourcing is expected to result in comparative advan-
tage eﬀects which benefit skilled labor and hurt unskilled labor. Domestic outsourcing
primarily aﬀects wages if there is an extent of the market eﬀect. Hence, domestic out-
sourcing is expected to be more beneficial for unskilled labor than foreign outsourcing,
and domestic outsourcing may raise wages for all workers.
1
Our empirical results turns out to be surprisingly supportive for the hypothesis that
outsourcing has comparative advantage eﬀects as well as extent of the market eﬀects.
Foreign outsourcing tends to reduce wages for low and medium-skilled workers, while
wages of high-skilled workers rise. In contrast, domestic outsourcing tends to increase
wages for low and medium-skilled workers, while there is no significant eﬀect on high-
skilled wages.
Two diﬀerent lines of the literature have considered the theoretical labor market im-
plications of specialization on the one hand and international outsourcing on the other.
Adam Smith famously argued that specialization gains are realized in larger markets by
increasing the division of labor, and an immediate consequence is that workers should be
able to command higher wages in larger markets. This key insight was later formalized by
Ethier (1982), who showed that intra industry trade in diﬀerentiated intermediate goods
can arise because firms find it profitable to split up their production processes. That is, a
larger number of intermediate goods become available from opening up for trade, and this
increases the productivity of final goods producers.1 That international outsourcing, on
the other hand, may reduce the relative wages of unskilled workers follows, for example,
from models on vertical foreign direct investment (see e.g. Feenstra & Hanson (2003)).
However even in the case where unskilled intensive production activities are moved abroad
it is also possible that unskilled labor may benefit because outsourcing entails cost sav-
ings for domestic industries as illustrated by e.g. Arndt (1997) and Kohler (2004). The
theoretical part of this paper combines elements from these two branches of literature in
a simple model that focuses on the impacts on absolute wage levels.
The empirical part of our paper is most closely related to Geishecker & Görg (2004).
They study the implications of foreign outsourcing on individual wages in a human capital
framework by using data on a large German household panel combined with industry level
data for the period 1991 to 2000. They find that foreign outsourcing generally reduces
wages of low-skilled workers and increases wages of high-skilled workers. We use a panel
data set of workers in Danish manufacturing industries combined with industry level data
for the period 1993 to 2000, and we find similar results as Geishecker & Görg (2004) with
respect to the eﬀects of foreign outsourcing. However, by using information on domestic
outsourcing, we find that outsourcing also entails extent of the market eﬀects, and this
eﬀect may be very diﬀerent from the comparative advantage eﬀect usually focused on in
the literature.
1Ethier’s division of labor model has since found numerous applications in eg. international trade,
growth theory and development. For a recent coherent exposition of this model and its variants, see
Francois & Nelson (2002). Becker & Murphy (1992) argue that the level of specialization also depends
on other considerations such as various coordination costs.
2
The paper is structured as follows. In the following section we set up a simple theoret-
ical model of specialization, outsourcing and wages. In section 3 we present our empirical
analysis, and in section 4 we conclude.
2 A simple model of outsourcing and wages
The purpose of this section is to set up a model that encompasses the two eﬀects of
outsourcing, i.e., the comparative advantage eﬀect and the extent of the market eﬀect.
The model distinguishes between outsourcing of activities intensive in unskilled labor and
outsourcing intensive in skilled labor, and by doing so it illustrates how outsourcing with
and without skill bias aﬀect wages.
We assume that a final good is produced by using inputs of capital, unskilled labor
and skilled labor. To allow for the possibility of outsourcing in the firm it is assumed
that the inputs of services from skilled and unskilled labor can be achieved in two ways:
either by employing labor in the firm or through outsourcing by purchasing intermediate
goods from other firms.2 More specifically, we assume that the production function is
Cobb-Douglas and given as:
Y = A
¡
Y αs Y
1−α
u
¢ρ
K1−ρ, (1)
where A > 0 and α, ρ ∈ (0, 1). Ys is a measure of the input of services produced by skilled
labor, Yu is a measure of the input of services produced by unskilled labor, and K is
capital. The inputs of services produced by skilled and unskilled labor are given as:
Ys = [L
γ
s +M
γ
s ]
1
γ , (2)
Yu = [L
γ
u +M
γ
u ]
1
γ , (3)
where γ ∈ (0, 1), and Ls(Lu) is the employment of skilled (unskilled) labor, whileMs(Mu)
is a measure of the input of intermediate goods produced by using skilled (unskilled)
labor, i.e. outsourcing. For now the outsourcing measures are simply taken as given, but
below we will return to how they may be determined. Also, for simplicity we assume
that the "production functions" for Ys and Yu are identical and given as constant returns
to scale CES functions, where the inputs of labor and intermediates enter symmetrically.
Notice that even if an increase in services of a certain type of labor can be achieved either
2In practice, services from capital can also be achieved through outsourcing, but to simplify we focus
on labor.
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by employing this type of labor in the firm or through outsourcing, the two inputs are
not perfect substitutes as long as γ < 1.
The wages of skilled and unskilled labor can be found as the marginal product of labor,
and it turns out that3
ws = αρA
∙
1 +
µ
Ms
Ls
¶γ¸αρ−γγ ∙
1 +
µ
Mu
Lu
¶γ¸ρ(1−α)γ µLu
Ls
¶ρ(1−α)µ
K
Ls
¶1−ρ
(4)
wu = (1− α) ρA
∙
1 +
µ
Ms
Ls
¶γ¸aργ ∙
1 +
µ
Mu
Lu
¶γ¸ρ(1−α)−γγ µLs
Lu
¶ραµ
K
Lu
¶1−ρ
(5)
A number of interesting results follows immediately from equations (4) and (5). First,
more outsourcing of a certain type of labor (i.e. a higher value of MsLs or
Mu
Lu ) gives rise to
an unambiguous increase in the wage of the other type of labor. This is so because the
marginal product of the other type of labor increases.
Second, it is ambiguous whether the wage of, say, unskilled labor, increases if there
is an increase in the outsourcing of activities intensive in the use of unskilled labor. The
wage increases if the elasticity of substitution between unskilled labor and outsourcing
is suﬃciently low.4 The intuition is that more outsourcing leads to a higher marginal
product of unskilled labor in production of unskilled services (i.e., Yu), and this eﬀect is
suﬃciently strong to "dominate" the fall in the marginal product of unskilled services in
the production of final goods.
Third, the equations also show that wages are increasing in the use of capital, and
the wages of unskilled (skilled) labor are rising in the relative employment of skilled to
unskilled (unskilled to skilled) labor.
Equations (4) and (5) illustrate how wages respond to changes in outsourcing, but
they do not explain how MuLu and
Ms
Ls are determined, and whether they change as a
result of globalization. To illustrate how the level of outsourcing may be determined we
borrow from Ethier (1982), who sets up a simple model of specialization in production of
intermediate goods. The details of the model is given in the appendix.
One central ingredient of the model is that the demand for labor comes from two
sources — the production of final goods (see (2) and (3)) and the production of intermediate
goods. The supplies of skilled and unskilled labor are assumed to be exogenous. Inputs of
3When deriving these wage equations, it has been assumed that the capital stock is fixed. If the capital
stock is endogenous, we get similar equations except that the cost of capital replaces the capital-labor
ratio as an explanatory variable.
4The elasticity of substitution is given as σ = 11−γ , and the exact condition for an increase in the wage
of unskilled labor is that σ < 11−ρ(1−α) .
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intermediate goods (i.e., outsourcing) in the production of the composite inputs (Ys and
Yu) are given as:
Ms =
" nsX
i=1
x
γ
si
# 1
γ
(6)
Mu =
" nuX
i=1
x
γ
ui
# 1
γ
(7)
where xui(xsi) is the input of a specific intermediate good produced by unskilled (skilled)
labor, and nu(ns) is the number of intermediate goods produced by unskilled (skilled)
labor.5 We note that there is a "return to variety" in the "production" of Ms and Mu.
That is, Ms or Mu rises if the number of intermediate goods rises, even if the total
production of intermediate goods is unchanged (i.e. for a given value of
Pns
i=1 xsi andPnu
i=1 xui). One justification of this is that it is easier to find inputs satisfying specific
needs in the production of final goods if there are more intermediates to choose from.
We follow Ethier (1982) in assuming that there is monopolistic competition in the
market for intermediate goods, and that each firm faces a fixed cost as well as a variable
cost of production. These costs are identical for firms producing the same type of inter-
mediate goods (i.e., goods intensive in either unskilled or skilled labor), but they may
vary over types of intermediate goods.
This specification has some interesting implications concerning outsourcing. First, we
find that the level of outsourcing does not depend on wages. Hence, the interdependence
between wages and outsourcing is fully determined by (4) and (5).
Second, an increase in the supply of unskilled (skilled) labor leads to more special-
ization in the sense that the number of varieties of the intermediate goods produced by
unskilled (skilled) labor increases. In other words, when the extent of the market in-
creases, more varieties in the supply of intermediate goods are produced, and because of
the aforementioned return to variety this makes it more profitable to outsource (MuLu (
Ms
Ls )
rises). This result is particularly interesting with regards to the implications of globaliza-
tion. One aspect of globalization is that firms get access to foreign labor markets such
that the "eﬀective" supply of labor rises, and this may result in specialization gains as
just described. Of course, the globalization process is often associated with easier access
to foreign labor markets abundant in unskilled labor, which, in our model, corresponds to
5The elasticity of substitution between the input of diﬀerent intermediate goods in the "production"
of Ms and Mu is assumed to be the same as the elasticity of substitution between labor and the input
of intermediate goods in the production of Ys and Yu. This assumption has no important qualitative
implications, but it enables us to get closed form solutions.
5
a higher supply of unskilled labor, Lu. This would lead to more outsourcing of activities
produced by unskilled labor, MuLu , and from equations (4) and (5) we know the implica-
tions for the wages of both types of labor as discussed earlier. This is the comparative
advantage eﬀect.
Third, a proportional increase in the supply of unskilled and skilled labor brings about
more outsourcing of both types (i.e. MuLu and
Ms
Ls ), and this improves wages of both types
of labor (see the appendix). Hence, a general increase in the extent of the market for
intermediate goods, and the implied increase in outsourcing benefits all workers as long
as the increase in the extent of the market is not biased too much towards the use of a
certain type of labor.
Fourth, similar to an increase in the labor supply, a reduction in the fixed or variable
cost of producing intermediate goods6 intensive in unskilled (skilled) labor also increases
the extent of the market for intermediate goods. This implies that there will be more
specialization and outsourcing of activities intensive in unskilled (skilled) labor. Moreover,
if there is a proportional decrease in the cost of producing the two types of intermediate
goods, there will be more outsourcing of both types, such that wages rise for both types
of labor.
The main conclusion from this theoretical section is that there are two important eﬀects
on wages associated with outsourcing: an extent of the market for intermediate goods,
and a comparative advantage eﬀect due to skill biased labor demand. The comparative
advantage eﬀect arises if outsourcing is biased towards activities which are intensive in,
say, unskilled labor. In that case the implication for unskilled wages is ambiguous, but
there is an unambiguous increase in wages for skilled workers. Hence, outsourcing may
aﬀect the relative wages between diﬀerent types of labor, and this relative wage eﬀect
is what most of the literature has focused on (see e.g. Feenstra & Hanson (2003)). In
contrast, the extent of the market eﬀect arises because there are specialization in general
and in turn more outsourcing. If there is no skill bias in the increase in the extent of the
market for intermediate goods, both types of labor benefit in terms of higher wages.
3 The empirical analysis
In order to assess the wage implications of outsourcing, we should ideally estimate the
wage equations given in (4) and (5). However, the theoretical model is simple and stylized,
and there is not a perfect match between the variables in the model and our data from
6A reduction in the variable cost can be interpreted as a reduction in transport cost, which is often
seen as another important aspect of globalization.
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the Danish manufacturing sector. First of all, we do not have information on whether
outsourced activities are intensive in the use of skilled or unskilled labor in our data.
However, we do have data on two diﬀerent types of outsourcing, namely domestic and
foreign outsourcing. Since Denmark is relatively abundant in skilled labor, our presump-
tion is that foreign outsourcing is relatively intensive in unskilled labor. Then, according
to our model, foreign outsourcing should benefit skilled workers, and to the extent that
employment of unskilled labor in the firm and foreign outsourcing are close substitutes,
foreign outsourcing should hurt unskilled workers. Further, it is likely that there is no skill
bias in domestic outsourcing — i.e., the content of skilled and unskilled labor in domestic
outsourcing reflect the relative supply of skilled and unskilled labor in the country — and
in that case domestic outsourcing is similar to a "pure" extent of the market eﬀect, and
so it should benefit both types of labor. A less clear-cut situation would arise if domestic
outsourcing also is biased but not as much towards unskilled labor as foreign outsourcing.
In that case all we can say is that domestic outsourcing benefits unskilled labor more than
foreign outsourcing, while foreign outsourcing benefits skilled labor more than unskilled
labor.
Another divergence between theory and empirical implementation is that our theoret-
ical model only distinguishes between two types of labor — skilled and unskilled. Since
it is likely that there are important diﬀerences between workers with basic education,
vocational education and further education, we distinguish between these three worker
types.
3.1 Data
To test our hypotheses we need information on the absolute wage level of diﬀerent types
of workers. We have access to a panel data set of workers in Danish manufacturing
industries for the years 1993-2000, and to this data set we add measures of outsourcing
at the industry level.
We measure domestic and foreign outsourcing in terms of intermediate inputs in pro-
duction at the industry level (55 manufacturing industries based on a Danish industry
code which is between the two-digit and three-digit NACE definition). Feenstra & Han-
son (1996) and Feenstra & Hanson (1999) consider two diﬀerent measures for foreign
outsourcing — a broad and a narrow measure. The broad measure is defined as the value
of all imported intermediate inputs of an industry, while the narrow measure restricts
attention to intermediate inputs that are purchased from the same industry as the good
being produced. The idea behind the narrow measure is that it only includes imported
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intermediate goods that could have been produced within the domestic industry, so this
measure arguably best captures the idea of outsourcing. We restrict attention to the nar-
row measure of foreign outsourcing, and in a similar way a narrow measure for domestic
outsourcing can be defined.
The domestic and foreign measures are constructed from input-output tables from
Statistics Denmark. According to our theoretical model, the input of intermediates should
be measured in terms of the input of labor used in production of final goods. However,
for simplicity, it was assumed in our theoretical model that there is no outsourcing of
capital services, but this is presumably the case in practice. Therefore, we follow Hijzen,
Görg & Hine (2005), among others, and define outsourcing as intermediate goods divided
by industry output. Figure 1 shows the measures of domestic and foreign outsourcing
as a weighted average for all manufacturing industries. As expected foreign outsourcing
has become more important during the period while domestic outsourcing declined in the
beginning of the period. The decline in domestic outsourcing is not that surprising given
that employment in manufacturing has fallen.7
The three industries with the highest level of foreign outsourcing in 2000 were manufac-
ture of fertilizers and nitrogen compounds, manufacture of basic precious and non-ferrous
metals, and manufacture of radio, television and communication equipment, all with out-
sourcing intensities above 20 percent. The three industries that experienced the highest
rise in foreign outsourcing from 1993 to 2000 were manufacture of fertilizers and nitrogen
compounds, manufacture of basic precious and non-ferrous metals, and manufacture of
wearing apparel. The three industries with the highest level of domestic outsourcing in
2000 were printing and service activities related to printing, manufacture of vegetable
and animal oils and fat, and publishing of newspapers, all with outsourcing intensities
between 10 and 15 percent. The three industries that experienced the highest rise in
domestic outsourcing from 1993 to 2000 were publishing of newspapers, publishing of
journals and periodicals, and manufacture of basic precious and non-ferrous metals. This
indicates that domestic outsourcing is more widespread in service based industries.
Insert Figure 1 about here
Since we use a diﬀerent measure of outsourcing than the one suggested by the theoret-
ical model, we have also tried two alternative measures of outsourcing. One is outsourcing
relative to the number of full-time workers, which is the measure suggested by equations
7The theoretical model predicts that outsourcing falls with declining employment (see the appendix).
From 1992 to 2000 total manufacturing employment fell by 5.2%.
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(4) and (5). However, it could be argued that, because of aggregation problems (the
composition of the workforce diﬀers across industries), outsourcing should be measured
in terms of the wage sum — this is the other alternative measure of outsourcing we apply.
It turned out that all three measures had qualitatively similar impacts on wages, so in
the following we only report results where outsourcing is measured in terms of production
value.
Our theoretical model also predicts that the relative employment of skilled and un-
skilled labor aﬀects wages. To take this into account we simply include the industry share
of workers with vocational education, and the share with further education (the reference
is basic education). Also the ratio of capital to skilled labor (unskilled labor) is an ex-
planatory variable in the wage equations of the theoretical model. To accommodate for
this, we construct a variable relating the return to capital to the wage sum
¡ rK
wL
¢
from
information about industry output (Y ) and industry wages (i.e. rKwL =
Y−wL
wL ).
We also include industry export and import. The export activity is likely to be cor-
related with firm productivity (see e.g. Bernard, Eaton, Jensen & Kortum (2003)) and
could thus aﬀect wages. A higher level of import penetration is likely to increase competi-
tion and reduce rents and wages. To control for other industry performance indicators, a
concentration ratio defined as the market share of the four biggest firms of each industry
has been included as a measure of domestic competition, and the size of the industry in
terms of the value of production is included to capture other unobserved industry charac-
teristics. A substantial literature documents that skill biased technological changes have
had an important eﬀect on the development in relative wages (see e.g. Berman, Bound &
Machin (1998)). We have tried to include the industry’s R&D intensity to capture such
eﬀects, but this variable was only available at a higher industry aggregation level, and it
had to be imputed for the year 2000 by a linear time trend. Since its inclusion only had
a negligible impact on the estimated coeﬃcients of the other variables, we opted to leave
it out. Finally, to capture business cycle eﬀects, local unemployment rates based on 51
local labor markets8 are included along with a full set of year dummies.
Information about individual characteristics of a 10 % sample of workers in Danish
manufacturing is extracted from the Integrated Database of labor Market Research (IDA)
and the Income Registers in Statistics Denmark. The hourly wage rate is clearly the most
important individual level variable in the analysis, and this wage rate is calculated as
total labor income divided by the total number of hours worked in any given year. A
few problems are encountered when using this IDA-wage rate. Most importantly, the
8The local labour markets are socalled commuting areas that are defined such that the internal mi-
gration rate is 50 % higher than the external migration rate, cf. Andersen (2000).
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measure for total labor income does not include mandatory pension fund payments, and
these payments have been rising over the 1990s but not in a uniform manner across
collective bargaining segments of the labor market. However, since the individual pension
fund payments are available in the data, it was straightforward to correct the wage rate.9
Also, a measurement error could arise as potential overtime work is not included in the
registered number of hours worked. Comparison with a presumably more exact individual
wage rate measure originating from The Confederation of Danish Employers (which is
only available for a limited number of years) shows only very small deviations, so we have
confidence in the validity of the (corrected) IDA wage rate.
A long list of individual socio economic characteristics are used as control variables
in the analysis. Of particular interest is information about education and occupation.
Information about individual occupation is based on the Danish version of the ISCO-88
definition, and we operate with the nine main categories.
Among other socio economic characteristics are self explanatory dummies for gender,
the presence of children, the presence of two adults in the household, city size, experience
and tenure10. There are also dummies for membership of unemployment insurance funds
and trade unions, and there are dummies for the size of the firm (or more precisely
workplace) in terms of the workforce.
We restrict the sample to include only full-time manufacturing workers in the age
group of 18-65 year olds. In the final data set there are 287.955 observations coming from
66.377 workers. Descriptive statistics for a selected set of variables are presented in Table
1.
Insert Table 1 about here
3.2 Empirical model
The empirical strategy is to test the predictions from the theoretical model by estimating
a simple Mincer human capital wage equation of the form
logwijt = α+ β
0xit + γzjt + αi + it, (8)
9Except for the years 1993 and 1994, where the pension fund payment had to be estimated based
on collective bargaining agreements for diﬀerent sections of the labour market. However in 1993 and
1994 pension fund payment were relatively small, so the measurement error arising from this procedure
is minimal.
10Information about workplace tenure only goes back to 1980, so an indicator variable for left censored
tenure is included.
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where wijt is worker is hourly wage in industry j at time t. Individual covariates such
as experience, experience squared and tenure are included in xit, and industry specific
variables — notably outsourcing variables — are contained in zjt. Individual unobserved
heterogeneity is controlled for by estimating a fixed eﬀects version of the wage equation
— a random eﬀects model was rejected in a standard Hausman specification test.
Two methodological issues should be considered when estimating the eﬀects of aggre-
gate variables (i.e. outsourcing at the industry level) on micro units. First, as shown by
Moulton (1990), the standard errors are biased downward in OLS regressions. We ac-
count for such clustering of individuals within industries by adjusting the standard errors
along the lines of Moulton (1990). Second, there is the question about endogeneity of
our variables of interest (i.e. outsourcing variables). It could be argued that outsourcing
not only aﬀects individual wages, but that wages also influence outsourcing decisions.
However, according to our theoretical model, there are no endogeneity problems as wages
have no eﬀect on the level of outsourcing. Moreover, as also argued in e.g. Geishecker &
Görg (2004), potential endogeneity problems are less of a concern when regressing indi-
vidual wages on industry level variables, since the industry’s outsourcing intensity may
be largely considered exogenous to the individual worker. Finally, the implications of
domestic outsourcing are really the novelty of this paper, and even if a part of individual
wages is an industry specific component, it is very unlikely that domestic outsourcing in a
specific industry is driven by the industry wage level, because the domestically outsourced
activities are by definition produced within that same domestic industry.
3.3 Results
The results of estimating diﬀerent versions of the wage equation (8) for the full sample
are presented in Table 2. For all three models of the table, most individual covariates
have expected signs; i.e. labor market experience, tenure and education are positively
related to wages. There appears to be no wage eﬀect of union membership whereas there
is a positive wage premium associated with being insured against unemployment. There
is also a significant firm size eﬀect, which is consistently found in the literature (see e.g.
Oi & Idson (1999)).
Insert Table 2 about here
With the purpose to investigate the importance of controlling for diﬀerent industry
characteristics, model 1 to 3 in the table diﬀer by successively including more industry
control variables. In model 3 with the full set of industry variables, it is seen that indus-
tries with a high concentration ratio as expected have relatively higher wages, indicating
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that less domestic product market competition leaves room for higher wages. Foreign
competition in the form of the import penetration does not have a significant impact,
but there is a wage premium for workers employed in industries that tend to export a
high share of their production. The last result is in accordance with Edin, Frederiksson
& Lundborg (2004) who study the Swedish labor market, but they also find a negative
eﬀect of imports.
Turning to the variables of primary interest, the first model in Table 2 includes only
the foreign and domestic outsourcing measures as industry characteristics, and foreign
outsourcing has a significantly negative impact on wages while domestic outsourcing has
a significant positive eﬀect. This picture is robust to the inclusion of more variables in
models 2 and 3, but the size of the coeﬃcient to foreign outsourcing roughly doubles.
Thus, in line with our theoretical model, domestic outsourcing raises individual wages,
presumably as a result of specialization gains. In contrast, foreign outsourcing reduces
wages suggesting that comparative advantage eﬀects are important in industries with high
foreign outsourcing intensities. We also note that a change in domestic outsourcing has a
numerical eﬀect on wages which is more than three times the eﬀect of a change in foreign
outsourcing (model 3). An increase in domestic outsourcing of one percentage point
leads to 0.34% higher wages, while a one percentage point increase in foreign outsourcing
reduces wages by 0.12%.
One of the main insights of our theoretical model was that outsourcing could have
diﬀerent eﬀects across skill groups. Foreign outsourcing is likely to be biased towards
activities intensive in unskilled labor, and in that case our model predicts that foreign
outsourcing should benefit skilled labor, while it is ambiguous how wages of unskilled
labor are aﬀected. With respect to domestic outsourcing, if it corresponds to a pure
extent of the market eﬀect in the sense as there is no skill bias, we expect that more
domestic outsourcing leads to higher wages for all workers. If instead there is a skill bias
in domestic outsourcing then it should clearly be less biased towards activities intensive
in unskilled labor than foreign outsourcing since Denmark is a skilled labor abundant
country. In that case all we can say is that domestic outsourcing should benefit unskilled
workers more than foreign outsourcing, and it should benefit skilled workers less than
foreign outsourcing.
To study these questions we have estimated the model for workers with three diﬀer-
ent levels of education: basic education, vocational education and further education, cf.
Table 3. We find that foreign outsourcing harms workers with both basic and vocational
education, but workers with further education gain from this type of outsourcing (which
is in line with the main result of Geishecker & Görg (2004)). This is consistent with the
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predictions of the theoretical model if, as presumed, foreign outsourcing is biased towards
unskilled labor and the elasticity of substitution between employment of unskilled labor in
the firm and outsourcing is relatively high. Moreover, workers with basic and vocational
education benefit from domestic outsourcing, while there is a positive but insignificant
impact on wages of workers with further education. Again, this is in accordance with our
theoretical model. Domestic outsourcing appears not to correspond to a pure extent of
the market eﬀect. Instead the results suggest that it is slightly biased toward skilled labor
as there is no eﬀect on high skilled wages.
Insert Table 3 about here
We recall that these results are robust to changes in the definition of the outsourcing
measures. As discussed in section 3.1 we have also measured outsourcing in terms labor
input and the wage sum, with the qualitative results of Tables 2 and 3 being essentially
unchanged.
4 Conclusion
The standard approach in the literature on wages and outsourcing is to focus entirely
on the consequences of foreign outsourcing. In this paper, we have diverted attention
towards the consequences of domestic outsourcing, such that the implications of both
types of outsourcing can be analyzed.
By using a simple theoretical model, we have argued that, in general, outsourcing is
associated with specialization gains arising from an increase in the extent of the market
for intermediate goods. If domestic outsourcing has no bias towards any type of labor, it
corresponds to a pure extent of the market eﬀect, and it increases wages for all workers.
In contrast, foreign outsourcing is expected to be biased towards activities intensive in
unskilled labor. Therefore, foreign outsourcing benefits skilled labor more than unskilled
labor, and it is likely that unskilled wages are decreasing in the level of foreign outsourcing.
By using data on the Danish labor market, we show that domestic outsourcing as
well as foreign outsourcing do aﬀect wages. As predicted by the theory, we find that
international outsourcing tends to raise wages of workers with further education and
lower wages of workers with basic and vocational education. In contrast, we find that
domestic outsourcing tends to raise wages of workers with basic and vocational education,
while domestic outsourcing has no significant impact on wages for workers with further
education.
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In this paper, we have considered domestic outsourcing and foreign outsourcing. An
interesting extension in future research would be to subdivide foreign outsourcing into
groups of destination countries according to their relative labor endowment. We would
expect that outsourcing to countries having a similar relative factor endowment as the
domestic economy mainly aﬀect wages through an increase in the extent of the market for
intermediate goods, and therefore benefits all types of labor. The comparative advantage
eﬀect is expected to be much more important when considering outsourcing to countries
with a very diﬀerent factor endowment, and outsourcing to these countries may hurt
unskilled labor.
References
Andersen, A. K. (2000), Commuting Areas in Denmark, AKF Forlaget, Copenhagen.
Arndt, S. W. (1997), ‘Globalization and the open economy’, North American Journal of
Economics and Finance 8, 71—79.
Becker, G. S. & Murphy, K. (1992), ‘The division of labor, coordination costs and knowl-
edge’, Quarterly Journal of Economics 107, 1137—1160.
Berman, E., Bound, J. & Machin, S. (1998), ‘Implications of skill-biased technological
change: International evidence’, Quarterly Journal of Economics 113, 1245—1279.
Bernard, A. B., Eaton, J., Jensen, J. B. & Kortum, S. (2003), ‘Plants and productivity
in international trade’, American Economic Review 93, 1268—1290.
Edin, P.-A., Frederiksson, P. & Lundborg, P. (2004), ‘The eﬀect of trade on earnings -
evidence from Swedish micro data’, Oxford Economic Papers 56, 231—241.
Ethier, W. J. (1982), ‘National and international returns to scale in the modern theory
of international trade’, American Economic Review 72, 389—405.
Feenstra, R. C. & Hanson, G. H. (1996), ‘Globalization, outsourcing, and wage inequality’,
American Economic Review 86, 240—245.
Feenstra, R. C. & Hanson, G. H. (1999), ‘The impact of outsourcing and high-technology
capital on wages: Estimates for the United States, 1979-1990’, Quarterly Journal of
Economics 114, 907—940.
14
Feenstra, R. C. & Hanson, G. H. (2003), Global production sharing and rising inequal-
ity: A survey of trade and wages, in E. K. Choi & J. Harrigan, eds, ‘Handbook of
International Trade’, Blackwell.
Francois, J. F. & Nelson, D. (2002), ‘A geometry of specialisation’, Economic Journal
112, 649—678.
Geishecker, I. & Görg, H. (2004), International outsourcing and wages: Winners and
losers. Working paper, University of Nottingham.
Hijzen, A., Görg, H. & Hine, R. C. (2005), ‘International outsourcing and the skill struc-
ture of labour demand in the United Kingdom’, Economic Journal 115, 861—879.
Kohler, W. (2004), ‘International outsourcing and factor prices with multistage produc-
tion’, Economic Journal 114, 166—185.
Moulton, B. R. (1990), ‘An illustration of a pitfall in estimating the eﬀects of aggregate
variables on micro units’, Review of Economics and Statistics 72, 334—338.
Oi, W. Y. & Idson, T. L. (1999), Firm size and wages, in A. Ashenfelter & D. Card, eds,
‘Handbook of Labor Economics’, Vol. 3, Elsevier Science, Amsterdam, pp. 2165—2214.
15
A Appendix: Theory
With respect to the markets of intermediate goods, we assume monopolistic competition,
and there is only one firm producing each variety. In the following, we focus on interme-
diate goods intensive in the use of skilled labor, but analogous expressions can be derived
with respect to intermediate goods intensive in the use of unskilled labor.
Using that the marginal product of a certain variety in the production of the final
good is equal to the price of this variety, we find that the relative demand of variety si
and variety sj (i 6= j) is
xsi
xsj
=
µ
psi
psj
¶ 1
γ−1
(9)
where psi is the price of variety si. Standard assumptions of monopolistic competition
implies that the firm producing variety si has no impact on quantity and price of other
intermediate goods, and, therefore, the price elasticity is 1γ−1 .
The cost of producing variety i of skilled inputs is:
Csi = ws (asxsi + bs) (10)
where ws is the wage of skilled labor. The fixed cost of production is wsbs, and the
marginal cost of producing and transporting variety si is asws. Hence, a change in as
may be a result of a change in production technology as well as transport costs.
By maximizing the profit of the firm producing variety si, and using the zero profit
condition, and that the firms producing diﬀerent varieties are symmetric, we find that11
psi = ps =
as
γ
ws (11)
xsi = xs =
γbs
(1− γ) as
(12)
The prices on all varieties become identical and equal to a mark up on the wage of
skilled labor. Moreover, as it is standard in these models, it turns out that all firms
produce the same amount which is increasing in the fixed cost of setting up a firm.
The total amount of outsourcing, and the cost or "price" of outsourcing (i.e. the cost
of obtaining one unit of Ms) become12:
11These derivations are standard, and can be found in e.g. Ethier (1982).
12This "price" can be found as the Lagrange multiplier in the following cost minimization problem:
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Ms =
γ
1− γ
bs
as
n
1
γ
s (13)
Ps =
as
γ
wsn
γ−1
γ
s (14)
We note that because of the "return to variety", more available varieties leads to a lower
Ps and a higherMs. I.e., if there are more intermediate goods to choose from, it is cheaper
to obtain a certain level or "quality" of the total input of intermediate goods. This implies
that outsourcing increases.
By maximizing profits in final good production, and using that the use of skilled labor
in producing intermediate goods and final goods add up to the supply of skilled labor, we
find that
ns =
1− γ
bs
Ls −
µ
as
γ
¶ γ
1−γ
(15)
Ms
Ls
=
"µ
γ
as
¶ γ
1−γ 1− γ
bs
Ls − 1
# 1
γ
(16)
Lu
Ls
=
bu
bs
µ
au
as
¶ γ
1−γ
(17)
A number of conclusions follow from equations (15)-(17). First, an increase in the supply
of skilled labor gives rise to an increase in the number of intermediate goods produced
by using skilled labor (i.e. ns increases). Hence, when there is an increase in the supply
of skilled labor available for producing the final good, and intermediate goods which
can be used to produce the final good, there is an increase in the extent of the market
for intermediate goods, which implies that there will be more specialization and more
outsourcing (i.e. MsLs increases).
Second, a reduction in the fixed cost (i.e. bs) or variable cost (i.e. as) of produc-
ing skilled labor intensive intermediate goods also gives rise to more specialization (ns
increases) and more outsourcing (MsLs increases).
Third, the symmetry of the model, implies that we get similar results with respect to
the supply of unskilled labor as well as the cost of producing intermediate goods intensive
in the use of unskilled labor.
min ps1xs1 + ps2xs2 + ...− Ps
⎡
⎣
" nsX
i=1
x
γ
si
# 1
γ
−Ms
⎤
⎦ .
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An increase in the supply of both types of labor may be seen as a "pure" extent of
the market eﬀect as there will be no skill bias. This leads to more outsourcing of both
types, and it can be shown that it gives rise to an unambiguous increase in the wage of
both types of labor, i.e.
∆Lu
L
=
∆Ls
L
> 0 ⇒ ∆ws > 0 and ∆ws > 0
Similarly, it can be shown that, if there is a proportional decrease in the cost (either
fixed cost or variable cost) of producing the two types of intermediate goods, there will be
an increase in both types of outsourcing, and there will be an increase in wages of both
types of labor. These positive wage eﬀects arise because of specialization gains.
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B Appendix: Tables and figures
Table 1. Sample means
Variables Mean Min. Max.
Log wage rate (DKR) 5.1412 3.7063 6.7790
Female 0.2817 0.0000 1.0000
Married 0.5563 0.0000 1.0000
Two adults 0.7251 0.0000 1.0000
Children 0-6 years 0.2218 0.0000 1.0000
Experience (years) 16.2593 0.0380 37.0000
Tenure (years) 5.0317 0.0000 20.0000
Censored tenure 0.0869 0.0000 1.0000
Basic education 0.4044 0.0000 1.0000
Vocational education 0.4492 0.0000 1.0000
Further edu. 0.1464 0.0000 1.0000
Union member 0.8264 0.0000 1.0000
UI fund member 0.9295 0.0000 1.0000
Firm size 0-10 0.0658 0.0000 1.0000
Firm size 11-50 0.2241 0.0000 1.0000
Firm size 51-200 0.3083 0.0000 1.0000
Firm size 200+ 0.4018 0.0000 1.0000
Copenhagen 0.1305 0.0000 1.0000
Big cities 0.1282 0.0000 1.0000
Rest of country 0.7412 0.0000 1.0000
Local unemployment rate (/10) 0.7441 0.3037 1.9308
Industry characteristics:
Production value (billion DKK/100) 0.1456 0.0069 0.4898
Concentration ratio 0.5306 0.2492 0.9993
Import ratio 0.6194 0.0000 7.8964
Export ratio 0.5859 0.0000 18.9833
Basic education share 0.3897 0.1250 0.6364
Vocational education share 0.4630 0.1667 0.6557
Further education share 0.1473 0.0044 0.6667
Capital labor ratio 2.9502 0.3338 75.2753
Foreign outsourcing 0.0503 0.0000 0.2828
Domestic outsourcing 0.0507 0.0000 0.1929
# observations 287.955
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Table 2. Estimation results
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Variables Coeﬀ. Std.err. Coeﬀ. Std.err. Coeﬀ. Std.err.
Married 0.0003 0.0017 0.0003 0.0017 0.0001 0.0017
Two adults 0.0151 0.0016 0.0151 0.0016 0.0151 0.0016
Children 0-6 years 0.0043 0.0014 0.0043 0.0014 0.0043 0.0014
Experience 0.0286 0.0009 0.0286 0.0009 0.0285 0.0009
Experience2 -0.0006 0.0000 -0.0006 0.0000 -0.0006 0.0000
Tenure 0.0019 0.0002 0.0019 0.0002 0.0019 0.0002
Censored tenure -0.0005 0.0061 -0.0010 0.0061 -0.0008 0.0060
Vocational education 0.4819 0.0084 0.4827 0.0084 0.4829 0.0084
Further education 0.5240 0.0149 0.5216 0.0148 0.5214 0.0148
Union member -0.0016 0.0020 -0.0014 0.0020 -0.0014 0.0020
UI fund member 0.1436 0.0046 0.1434 0.0046 0.1433 0.0046
Occ. managers 0.0498 0.0035 0.0495 0.0035 0.0497 0.0035
Occ. professionals 0.0245 0.0036 0.0242 0.0036 0.0242 0.0036
Occ. technicians 0.0076 0.0026 0.0075 0.0026 0.0075 0.0026
Occ. clerks -0.0106 0.0030 -0.0106 0.0030 -0.0105 0.0030
Occ. service -0.0102 0.0037 -0.0106 0.0037 -0.0106 0.0037
Occ. agriculture 0.0418 0.0052 0.0417 0.0052 0.0415 0.0052
Occ. craft -0.0032 0.0021 -0.0026 0.0021 -0.0025 0.0021
Occ. mach. operators 0.0033 0.0017 0.0030 0.0017 0.0029 0.0017
Firm size 1-10 -0.0365 0.0031 -0.0354 0.0030 -0.0352 0.0030
Firm size 51-200 0.0273 0.0018 0.0255 0.0018 0.0254 0.0018
Firm size 200+ 0.0429 0.0023 0.0393 0.0023 0.0392 0.0023
Big cities -0.0223 0.0068 -0.0232 0.0068 -0.0236 0.0068
Rest of country -0.0261 0.0055 -0.0270 0.0054 -0.0273 0.0054
Local unemployment -0.0096 0.0064 -0.0069 0.0064 -0.0066 0.0064
Production value -0.0986 0.0859 -0.1091 0.0863
Concentration ratio 0.0619 0.0069 0.0511 0.0075
Import ratio -0.0018 0.0016 -0.0020 0.0016
Export ratio 0.0039 0.0011 0.0040 0.0011
Voc. edu. share -0.0544 0.0177 -0.0492 0.0180
Further edu. share 0.0460 0.0159 0.0496 0.0159
Capital labor ratio 0.0025 0.0006
Foreign outsourcing -0.0606 0.0205 -0.1250 0.0232 -0.1199 0.0231
Domestic outsourcing 0.3465 0.0406 0.3674 0.0437 0.3449 0.0434
Constant 4.3828 0.0147 4.3718 0.0183 4.3693 0.0183
# observations 287,955 287,955 287,955
R2 0.8917 0.8919 0.8919
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Table 3. Estimation results, Educational subgroups
Basic education Vocational edu. Further edu.
Variables Coeﬀ. Std.err. Coeﬀ. Std.err. Coeﬀ. Std.err.
Married -0.0119 0.0029 0.0014 0.0023 0.0217 0.0040
Two adults 0.0098 0.0024 0.0123 0.0023 0.0059 0.0038
Children 0-6 years 0.0037 0.0023 0.0035 0.0019 0.0036 0.0030
Experience 0.0321 0.0017 0.0238 0.0015 0.0189 0.0020
Experience2 -0.0006 0.0000 -0.0004 0.0000 -0.0008 0.0000
Tenure 0.0026 0.0004 0.0025 0.0003 0.0024 0.0006
Censored tenure -0.0269 0.0086 -0.0064 0.0082 -0.0207 0.0146
Union member 0.0184 0.0038 -0.0064 0.0026 -0.0118 0.0036
UI fund member 0.1465 0.0062 0.0320 0.0068 0.0163 0.0092
Occ. managers 0.0269 0.0061 0.0400 0.0049 0.0825 0.0079
Occ. professionals 0.0492 0.0114 0.0213 0.0065 0.0377 0.0065
Occ. technicians 0.0163 0.0053 0.0145 0.0036 0.0237 0.0061
Occ. clerks -0.0240 0.0056 -0.0038 0.0037 0.0187 0.0082
Occ. service -0.0045 0.0057 -0.0101 0.0046 0.0023 0.0144
Occ. agriculture 0.0348 0.0067 0.0428 0.0078 0.0522 0.0300
Occ. craft -0.0057 0.0030 0.0053 0.0027 0.0270 0.0079
Occ. mach. operators 0.0009 0.0020 0.0049 0.0026 0.0089 0.0086
Firm size 1-10 -0.0307 0.0053 -0.0374 0.0038 -0.0553 0.0110
Firm size 51-200 0.0386 0.0031 0.0208 0.0024 0.0063 0.0049
Firm size 200+ 0.0590 0.0039 0.0324 0.0031 0.0124 0.0056
Big cities -0.0277 0.0122 -0.0213 0.0110 -0.0358 0.0112
Rest of country -0.0122 0.0094 -0.0215 0.0089 -0.0239 0.0076
Local unemployment 0.0129 0.0093 -0.0081 0.0081 -0.0193 0.0140
Production value -0.1261 0.1881 -0.0542 0.0888 0.1728 0.1908
Concentration ratio 0.0510 0.0117 0.0587 0.0094 0.0306 0.0161
Import ratio -0.0020 0.0025 -0.0014 0.0023 0.0018 0.0032
Export ratio -0.0013 0.0018 0.0049 0.0017 0.0039 0.0024
Voc. edu. share -0.1370 0.0296 0.0415 0.0225 0.0793 0.0389
Further edu. share -0.0120 0.0257 0.0856 0.0216 0.0703 0.0327
Capital labor ratio 0.0025 0.0009 0.0011 0.0006 0.0016 0.0010
Foreign outsourcing -0.1627 0.0334 -0.1049 0.0307 0.1037 0.0463
Domestic outsourcing 0.2968 0.0540 0.3107 0.0482 0.0411 0.0472
Constant 4.5168 0.0286 4.7685 0.0274 5.1603 0.0422
# observations 116,447 129,347 42,161
R2 0.8977 0.8426 0.9151
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Figure 1: Foreign and domestic outsourcing in Danish manufacturing industries.
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